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Abstract 
Despite many academic studies in the last 15 years acknowledging the investigative value of 
physical memory due to the potential sensitive nature of data it may contain, it arguably remains 
rarely collected at-scene in most criminal investigations. Whilst this may be due to factors such 
as first responders lacking the technical skills to do this task, or simply that it is overlooked as an 
evidence source, this work seeks to emphasise the worth of this task by demonstrating the ability 
to recover plain-text login credentials from it. Through an examination of logins made to 15 popular 
online services carried out via the Chrome, Edge and Mozilla Firefox browsers, testing shows that 
plain-text credentials are present in RAM in every case. Here, a transparent test methodology is 
defined and the results of test cases are presented along with ‘string markers’ which allow a 
practitioner to search their RAM captures for the presence of unknown credential information for 
these services in future cases.  
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1 Introduction 
Random Access Memory (RAM), also frequently referred to as physical memory (both terms will 
be used interchangeably from here-on) is a core component of all computer systems. It facilitates 
the short-term storage of data allowing for the efficient retrieval of content which is frequently 
accessed by the device, where as Okolica and Peterson (2011, p.118) indicate that ‘a computer’s 
memory provides the most up to date snapshot of a machine’s state’. The volatile nature of RAM 
means that its contents are lost when power is removed from the system (ENISA, 2015; Voelzow, 
2017) placing emphasis on the need for first responders to collect this content at the first 
appropriate opportunity. Whilst there is the potential for content to be paged (on Microsoft 
operating systems or equivalent processes on other platforms) to the Pagefile.sys  (which enables 
‘the system to remove infrequently accessed modified pages from physical memory to let the 
system use physical memory more efficiently for more frequently accessed pages’ (Microsoft, 
2019)), this file is not guaranteed to contain all data which was once present in RAM. In addition, 
the hiberfil.sys may also contain RAM data following a system hibernation, but again is not 
guaranteed to do so if this feature is disabled or hibernation is not activated.  
 
RAM content will contain trace evidence of a user’s short-term behaviours in regards to their 
actions on a given computer system (Stevens and Casey, 2010; Thomas et al., 2013; Hausknecht 
et al., 2015; Leimich et al., 2016), information which may not be present on less volatile system 
data storage forms such as the system disk drive. In criminal investigation contexts, the collection 
of RAM must be done at-scene when the device is still active (and if the device is even active in 
the first instance). In most cases, this involves the introduction and execution of specialist 
software on the suspect system itself, causing RAM content to be written to a form of sanitised 
external storage media. This ‘RAM dump’ can then be analysed via tools such as Volatility (found 
at https://www.volatilityfoundation.org/) which can parse known structures, via basic GREP 
keyword searches (an often utilised approach to RAM data extraction due to the simplicity of the 
method), through known signatures or in some cases specific memory locations can be queried 
(Malin et al., 2012). In the context of a forensic examination of a device, RAM has been shown to 
contain plain-text password strings, running process information, encryption keys, malware traces 
and Internet history remnants (It has been long since accepted that RAM can and often does 
contain sensitive information related to device usage (Hejazi et al., 2009; Maartmann-Moe et al., 
2009; Wang et al., 2009; Casey and Aquilina, 2010;  Balogun and Zhu, 2013;  Barhate and 
Jaidhar, 2013; Rafique and Khan, M.N.A.,  2013; Richard III and Case, 2014; Thongjul and 
Tritilanunt, 2015; Lillis et al., 2016). As a result, it can offer important information for supporting 
an investigation of suspect activity on a device. Due to both the potentially volatility and sensitivity 
of its content, it is important that practitioners and first responders now consider RAM as a core 
element of their data collection processes at-scene, making sure that it is acquired via a suitable 
forensic process and thoroughly examined (Schuster, 2008; Walters and Petroni, 2007; 
Caviglione et al., 2017; Schatz and Cohen, 2017; Schramp, 2017). 
 
This work provides the results of RAM testing and analysis for the purpose of determining the 
presence of plain-text login credential information following logins made via an Internet browser 
to online services. Logins were made to 15 online services using Chrome, Edge and Mozilla 
Firefox. Subsequent RAM acquisition and analysis reveals that plain-text password information is 
stored in RAM following logins by all browsers for all services. However, only 10 services 
consistently store credential information in a format where GREP syntax can be identified to 
extract credential information from RAM for these services for unknown credential information 
across all three browsers. A transparent methodology for testing is described which is hoped will 
foster peer-review and facilitate further work in the area of RAM analysis and credential 




Despite Hoelz et al., in 2011 suggesting RAM capture at-scene was slowly increasing in 
prevalence, it is arguably still not undertaken at all available opportunities at-scene. This is despite 
both the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO, 2012) and Interpol (2019) indicating that this 
should be one of the first processes considered by a first responder where collection is feasible, 
as opposed to older positions of ‘pulling the plug’ on a system for subsequent dead-box analysis 
(Sutherland, 2008). It should also be noted that RAM capture is not always possible (a device 
may be off for example) or feasible if there is not the equipment to carry out the task or that a first 
responder is not trained to do so.  
 
Within the context of this work, focus will be maintained on the recovery of login credential 
information relating to services which a user has accessed via an Internet browser. Existing 
studies have shown that it is possible to retrieve password information from RAM (see Davidoff, 
2008; Zhao and Cao, 2009; Simon and Slay, 2010; Xu and Wang, 2013), with Simon and Slay 
(2010) highlighting the value of this information to a forensic investigation. 
 
“Recovery of passwords may be of value for user profiling as the target may use the 
same password for other applications. Depending on the particular communication 
technology being used, passwords may be exploited to obtain additional information. 
For example, some systems provide a web based account information page that 
may provide access to information such as voicemail messages or contact history 
that would not otherwise be available. (Simon and Slay, 2010)” 
 
Where a suspect has accessed an online service, likely through a browser, access to this 
information often requires knowledge of these credentials. Let's consider the hypothetical 
scenario that a suspect has accessed a cloud storage provider to hide illegal material. A digital 
forensic investigator may determine usage of the service via Internet History records but this often 
does not reveal the full extent of the usage of this service, where access to it may be required. 
An investigator may pursue access in a number of ways, first, self-disclosure of the account details 
and content from the suspect, second, a lawful disclosure request made to a service provider 
within the bounds of applicable laws, or finally, a lawful login could be made (subject to acquiring 
the appropriate legal permission) by an investigating authority if credentials can be obtained. 
Arguably the final of these options provides the quickest option to pursuing investigatory leads, 
allowing practitioners to control the extraction of data from the service themselves without relying 
on any third party disclosure processes. Yet this option requires identifying what these credentials 
are, where RAM analysis may help. 
 
Acquiring access to a service often requires identifying both a username (often overlooked in 
RAM analysis studies) and an associate password for the account. These may be obfuscated if 
stored locally on a system hard drive, however as indicated in previous studies, credentials can 
be ‘leaked’ into RAM and shown in plain text. As a result, where a suspect has logged into an 
online service and their machine remains active, RAM capture may reveal credential content. 
 
3 Methodology 
As part of testing for the presence of credentials in RAM (particularly when repeat testing is 
involved), the prevention of test contamination is important to ensure the validity of any results. 
This section documents the testing methodology utilised in this work, where Figure 1 provides an 
overview of the experimental setup, to allow for transparency and effective scrutiny of the work. 
To start, 15 services were utilised in testing (shown in Table 1). Each service examined as part 
of this work first had an account created using a lab PC (separate to the test PC where RAM 
acquisition occurred), with a unique string set as the account password. This prevented any 
contamination of RAM by the account credentials prior to a login attempt for that service. Once 
the account was setup, the service account was then accessed via a test PC (running OS 
Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise, Version 10.0.17763, Build 17763, with 8GB of RAM), where a 
login would be made (only 1). The login process was left to complete until the homepage of the 
service website was reached and completely loaded. At this point, a RAM capture was initiated 
using FTK Imager (V. 4.2.0.13). This RAM capture was then searched using FTK Imager for the 
presence of both ANSI and Unicode plain-text login credentials that to carry out the login, with 
each instance manually examined and recorded. Finally, testing has focused on RAM captured 
content only where the Pagefile.sys was not covered within the experimentation.  
 
 
Figure 1: Experiment methodology. 
 
This process was iterative where the Lab PC would be used to re-access the service, change the 
password credentials to another unique string allowing the Test PC to re-access the account with 
a subsequent login using updated credentials. To stress, the first time that each specific set of 
login credential strings were entered into the Test PC was the first time a login was made with 
this information. This process was repeated five times for each service. Each set of five RAM 
captures was examined to establish the presence of any consistent marker strings which could 
be used to identify the credentials.  
 
*To note:- Identifying that credentials are stored in RAM in the first instance is only valuable to 
the digital forensic practitioner if there is a way to extract these. Marker strings allow unknown 
credentials to be searched for in RAM captures (see Figure 2). In most investigations, a 
practitioner will not know the password strings used by a suspect (as if they did, there would be 
no requirement for such password extraction processes). As a result in order to attempt to extract 
plain text passwords accurately and on a consistent basis, marker strings which either directly 
precede or follow a password string must be established. This allows practitioners to search any 
RAM captures, where the presence of a marker string may indicate also that a plain text credential 
is also retrievable. If a marker string is unique to a particular service, the presence of it in RAM 
may also reveal the service in which a password belongs to.  
 
  
Figure 1: Marker strings for credential extraction. 
 
To place the value of string markers in context, where a DF practitioner in a given case has both 
an image of a device and a RAM capture, it may be possible to both identify the services used 
by a suspect, and the credentials they have used to access it. Through an analysis of Internet 
history on the system, use of specific services by the suspect may be identifiable through URL 
analysis (for example Twitter login pages). By searching an associated RAM capture for marker 
strings, it may be possible to extract an associated plaintext password. However, in cases 
where the service does not maintain a unique marker string and multiple services have been 
used by a suspect (discussed in the results later), a practitioner may face trial and error in terms 
of which password correlates to which service.  
 
The aforementioned process was repeated across the Chrome (v79.0.3945.117), Edge 
(v44.17763.1.0) and Firefox (v72.0.1) Internet browsers to determine whether traits of the login 
process differ in RAM between applications. 
 
*To note:- In all cases, the identification and extraction of both username and password 
credentials has been attempted. 
 
4 Results 
Table one provides the results of RAM credential extraction for 15 online services across three 
Internet browsers. 
 
Table 1: Ram extraction results (Table submitted as a seperate .xlsx file). 
 
It is important to note that in every test undertaken in all browsers tested, a plaintext password 
could be found. However, as noted in Table 1, only instances where a consistent string marker 
could be used to identify credential information were recorded. Where no consistent marker could 
be identified for a set of tests, ‘NO Consistent GREP’ is recorded.  
 
*To Note: String marker searches should be conducted in both ASCII and Unicode as both formats 
may appear in RAM. 
 
For all 15 services, credentials entered via the Chrome Internet browser could be extracted during 
testing with the string markers noted in Table 1. Instagram, Reddit, Flickr and Dropbox maintained 
no consistent string markers when a login was made in the Edge and Firefox browsers. Ask.FM 
maintained no consistent string marker when a login was made in the Edge browser. 
 
It can be seen from the results that multiple services maintain the same string marker for their 
password credentials in RAM (for example, Yahoo! and MySpace). As a result, it is important that 
practitioners examine thoroughly the Internet history on a device in order to identify which online 
services are likely to have been accessed. Where multiple services have been accessed which 
deploy the same password marker strings, practitioners may be faced with having to try multiple 
passwords should they exist in RAM. Whilst time-wise this should not be too much of a burden, 
they should be aware that some accounts implement security measures for too many incorrect 
password inputs. One way to help here is to consider whether a matching username string marker 
exists, as this will help to distinguish what service a password belongs to, as with Yahoo! and 
MySpace, they both utilize different username string markers. 
 
5 Conclusions and talking points  
This work has demonstrated that not only are online service credentials present in RAM in 
plaintext, but that they are also stored in a way which allows their extraction by a practitioner using 
the GREP syntax recorded in Table 1. However, following testing there are three main areas 
requiring further discussion. 
 
1. Persistence: The persistence of data in RAM must be considered following general usage 
of a system over time (Burdach, 2006; Solomon et al., 2007). The methodology in the work 
aims to establish the recoverability of credentials from RAM and does not explore 
persistence as a testing variable. Given that it has been shown that credentials are 
present, an examination of the persistence of this content following prolonged system 
usage is the next logical step to work in this area. Such work would provide an insight into 
the window of opportunity a practitioner may have in order for extracted RAM to contain 
credentials from historic logins. In addition, it will also allow paging to be considered and 
examined, where it is expected that the string markers noted in Table 1 should also be of 
value in this context, but testing is required to confirm this. 
 
2. Remember me: Most online services offer a ‘remember me’ function (an example is shown 
in Figure 3) which allows automatic logins to services or sustained open sessions. Where 
a ‘remember me’ option is engaged, the user is not required to type their password into 
the required field like the actions tested within this work. 
 
 
Figure 3: The ‘remember me’ function.  
 
The impact of the ‘remember me’ function must be considered as it is common for users 
to engage this when utilising their own personal devices. As a result, if a device is seized 
by a practitioner, it may be the case that any login to an online service has occurred in this 
way as opposed to a typed-in login. To provide an initial assessment, the following 
methodology was deployed within our test PC. A unique password string was set for a 
sub-set of chosen services (Facebook, Titter, Yahoo and Pinterest) and their ‘remember 
me’ (or equivalent’) option was initialised. The PC was then turned off to ensure a RAM 
contents purge, where the device was then powered back on and a login to each service 
was carried out (no password typing) followed by RAM acquisition. In all cases, no 
credential information was present in the RAM dump for any services.  
 
3. Vicinity Searching: Vicinity searching is a concept coined here to describe a search which 
can get a practitioner within an ‘area of a RAM dump’ where credentials are stored, but 
not consistently close to it. This scenario has been noted by Davidoff (2008) with regards to 
clear text password recovery from Linux memory and the difficulties with identifying consistent 
GREP string search criteria.  A visual representation of vicinity searching is presented in 
Figure 4, where perhaps the best example to explain this concept is a comparison between 
the highlighted string markers for extracting Facebook credentials and the lack of a 
consistent string marker for Dropbox credentials for the Firefox and Edge browsers.  
 
 
Figure 4: The concept of a vicinity search. 
 
In relation to Facebook, the marker <&pass=> is directly before a user’s plaintext 
password string. However, following testing, no such markers could be established for a 
Dropbox password in RAM when a login is made via Edge and Mozilla. Yet, plaintext 
passwords are present, and following an analysis of their position in RAM, testing 
indicated that the password appears consistently in the vicinity of the string marker 
<l.o.g.i.n._.p.a.s.s.w.o.r.d> (0x 6C 00 6F 00 67 00 69 00 6E 00 5F 
00 70 00 61 00 73 00 73 00 77 00 6F 00 72 00 64). This is shown in Figures 
5 and 6 where a Dropbox password string is within 21 bytes (Figure 5) and 405 bytes 
(Figure 6).  
 
 
Figure 5: Dropbox vinivity search password (Part 1). 
 
Figure 6: Dropbox vicinity search password (Part 2). 
 
The idea behind a vicinity search is that it does not provide the practitioner with a defined 
set distance (in terms of number of bytes) away from a set of credentials, but can place 
them near to one, at which point the practitioner is required to manually review surrounding 
data to determine if a potential password may be present. The value of this concept is that 
in cases where no string marker exists, given that plain text passwords were present in 
RAM for all services and all browsers, this concept has the potential to be used to offer a 
chance of password recovery. 
 
Vicinity searching requires further exploration to determine its worth in regards to 
identifying the extent to which it can be utilised for credential recovery and to determine 
its margin of error (how close a search can get to a credential). In addition, the 
development of a formalised vicinity search methodology is required and as a result, this 
concept is identified as an important element of future work. 
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 A RAM examination if offered for service access via Edge, Chrome and Firefox. 
 16 services examined for credential recovery in RAM. 
 String markers are identified for credential recovery. 
 
